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Abstract
China's quest to have world-class universities has entered a new phase since 
2015, with the 'Double World-Class Project' replacing the '985 Project' and the '211 
Project' launched in the 1990s. The transition from World-Class 1.0 to World-Class 
2.0 provides a good window onto changes in China's policymaking. The prevail-
ing literature has identiﬁed broad trends such as institutionalization, decentrali-
zation and expanded participation. While this paper ﬁnds evidence in support of 
the prevailing literature, it also challenges the thesis of institutionalization, de-
centralization and expanded participation. The celebrated evolution from 'hierar-
chical governance' to 'network governance' or from 'consultation' to 'deliberation' 
in China's policymaking, however desirable, is premature—especially for multi-
billion, high-stakes policy initiatives such as the 'Double World-Class Project'. 
Keywords: policymaking, Double World-Class Project, institutionalization, decen-
tralization, world-class universities
Introduction
China launched the 'Double World-Class Project' in 2015 to develop 
world-class universities and disciplines. The full list of participating 
universities was announced in September 2017, consisting of 42 to be 
developed into world-class institutions ('World-Class Universities' 
hereafter) and another 95 into universities with world-class disciplines 
('Universities with World-Class Disciplines' hereafter). Dubbed as 
'World-Class 2.0', the Double World-Class Project replaces the '211 
Project' and '985 Project', initiated in the 1990s to advance Chinese 
universities in major international league tables (Altbach 2013; Ngok 
and Guo 2008; Wang et al. 2013).1 As China's most important initia-
tive in higher education under the Xi Jinping leadership, this new 
multibillion project immediately attracted attention from university 
ranking organizations (Grove 2017), online news outlets (Gao 2017; 
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Huang 2017; Newton-Tanzer 2017) and education scholars (Peters 
and Besley 2018).
The Double World-Class Project provides a good opportunity to ob-
serve China's often opaque policymaking. A comparison with the 985 
Project and the 211 Project allows for even more insights. The prevailing 
literature on China's governance and policymaking has focused much 
attention on institutionalization (Chen and Naughton 2016), fragmen-
tation (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Mertha 2009), decentralization 
(Mok 2002; Ngok 2007) and expanded consultation (Benner et al. 2012). 
Research on China's education policymaking largely agrees with these 
broad themes. For instance, Han and Ye (2017: 390) note that the most 
important changes in China's education policymaking are 'the transition 
from a Party-dominant practice to one primarily driven by the central 
government, the enhanced role of higher education institutions (HIEs) 
and scholars as ''professional interest group'' in the Chinese context 
and the increasing participation of non-governmental actors in the 
policymaking process'. 
However, as Benner et al. (2012: 269) comment, 'how this balance [of 
the relationship between central goal articulation and decentralized 
deliberation], unstable as it is and perhaps must be, will play out in the 
future is a key issue for students of Chinese politics in the years to come'. 
There is still much ambiguity within the existing theories and models 
regarding the structures, processes and outcomes of China's policymak-
ing. Due to unequal power relations among various policy stakeholders, 
the expansion of public and expert consultation does not necessarily 
result in a shift from top-down steering to bottom-up policymaking, or 
from hierarchical governance to polycentric governance. For instance, 
while public participation is necessary for policy responsiveness and 
representativeness, it may be 'used for public relations and propaganda 
purposes to legitimate the still-government-dominated policymaking 
process' (Han and Ye 2017: 407). More broadly, institutionalization, de-
centralization and bottom-up participation are multifaceted processes. 
As policy issues are becoming increasingly complex, studies looking 
for evidence of these trends probably overlook signs of irregularity, 
recentralization and top-down steering. 
This paper seeks to make a nuanced assessment of changes in China's 
education policymaking by comparing the new Double World-Class 
Project with the previous 985 Project. In line with the prevailing lit-
erature, it focuses on the broad themes of institutionalization, decen-
tralization and expanded participation. Nonetheless, it pays as much 
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attention to evidence in support of these themes as to evidence challeng-
ing them. In terms of methodology, the paper relies on documentary 
analysis, drawing heavily on government documents, press releases 
by stakeholder ministries, written accounts by participants, published 
research papers and media reports. Documentary analysis is an often-
used methodology for research on China's education policymaking 
(Han and Ye 2017).   
Changing Patterns of Policymaking in China: Literature 
Review
Informed by the large and diverse literature on neoliberalism, govern-
ance and globalization, research on China's policymaking has identi-
ﬁed a number of broad and somewhat overlapping themes. One is the 
institutionalization of rules and procedures that regulate policymaking 
(Liu et al. 2011; Ma and Lin 2012). The 'institutionalization paradigm' 
is widely found in research on China's science and technology (S&T) 
governance. Chen and Naughton (2016) offer a useful operational 
deﬁnition. Policy process institutionalization increases as '(a) the 
number and type of interest/opinion groups routinely represented 
increases; (b) tasks in the policy process are assigned to different actors 
in predictable ways; (c) the complexity and level of detail of policy 
outcomes increases; and (d) objectives and criteria of policy are avail-
able that can serve as the basis for discussion and argument among 
diverse opinion groups'. This view of institutionalization highlights 
greater policy rationalization, interest representation, specialization, 
predictability and accountability. According to Chen and Naughton 
(2016), institutionalization is a growing trend in nearly every policy 
area in China.
A second broad theme, well established in research on China's eco-
nomic and social policy, is decentralization. In the 1980s, ﬁscal decen-
tralization was used to make local governments commit to economic 
growth. The central government devolved ﬁnancial responsibilities 
to the provincial government in the form of ﬁscal contracts. In return, 
provincial governments were allowed to retain most of the revenues. 
The same arrangement was replicated down the government hierarchy 
from provincial to prefectural and county governments. Economists 
have used ﬁscal decentralization to explain China's remarkable growth. 
Some scholars have gone even further to argue that such a central–local 
relationship has far-reaching consequences beyond economic growth. 
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It has led to institutional building in the form of 'market preserving 
federalism' (Montinola et al. 1995; Qian and Weingast 1997).      
Social policy scholars pay more attention to the downside of ﬁscal 
decentralization. In the case of basic education, the responsibility for pro-
vision and funding was further pushed down from county governments 
to township governments and even villages (Zhao 2009). In the 1980s 
and 1990s, excessive decentralization resulted in unprecedented levels 
of inequality in per-student spending between places where village and 
township governments found a new source of funding in the thriving 
Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) and those where local govern-
ments had to rely on educational surcharges and tuition fees collected 
from farming households and student families (Hannum 2003). The same 
pattern was also observed for healthcare (Zhang and Kanbur 2005). 
In many places where local governments had few TVEs to tap into, 
the strategy of decentralization became increasingly difﬁcult to sustain. 
Complaints and protests against peasant burdens involving farming 
households began to threaten rural stability in the 1990s. Likewise, 
unpaid salaries for teachers undermined the stability and quality of 
rural education. In the 2000s, China started to shift away from excessive 
decentralization towards some degree of recentralization in an effort to 
build a more stable and regularized ﬁnancing mechanism, evidenced 
in the considerably higher share of central government spending on 
education (Zhao et al. 2018). 
By comparison, the strategy of decentralization works better for higher 
education, in large part because decentralization in higher education 
has never been as extreme as in basic education. Experimentation in this 
area ﬁrst appeared in Guangdong in the form of 'joint development', 
a co-funding scheme for universities previously ﬁnanced by central 
ministries. In 1993, the State Education Commission and Guangdong 
provincial government reached an agreement to jointly administer and 
fund Sun Yat-Sen University and South China University of Technology, 
the top two universities in Guangdong. The shift to the dual leadership 
did not reduce the ﬁnancial support from central government, but se-
cured commitment from the provincial government to provide capital 
investment funds to the two universities under joint development. The 
Guangdong experience was later promoted nationwide. In 1995, the cen-
tral government endorsed 'joint development' as one of the four major 
strategies to reform China's higher education system (Mok 2005).2 
While there has been a clear trend towards decentralization in higher 
education, there are also cases of recentralization. A different type of 
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'joint development' emerged in the 2000s. To help inland provinces 
develop their higher education facilities, the central government de-
cided in 2004 to select one locally administered university for priority 
funding through 'joint development' in each of the 12 provinces in the 
central and western regions where there are no centrally administered 
universities (Mok 2005). 
A third broad theme is expanded participation. Research on China's 
S&T has noted the salient role that prominent scientists play in initiat-
ing and planning S&T development. For instance, the National High 
Technology Programme, one of China's earliest R&D programmes in 
the post-Mao period, was created based on a letter submitted to national 
leaders by four prominent scientists. The scientists stressed the need for 
accelerating China's high-tech development, reminding the leaders of US 
Strategic Defense Initiatives and Europe's EUREKA Programme. After 
Deng Xiaoping's approval, the State Council mobilized hundreds of ex-
perts in 1986 to draft an 'Outline for Development of High Technology'. 
The resulting programme, also known as the '863 Programme', remains 
one of the most important national S&T initiatives today. Another pro-
gramme—National Key Basic Research Programme—came about in a 
similar way. A group of concerned scientists made a proposal through 
China's top advisory body—the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference—in March 1997 that the government should give more sup-
port to basic research. Then Premier Li Peng heeded to the suggestion and 
a new programme known as the '973 Programme' was created (Benner 
et al. 2012). Over time, China's S&T policymaking has been increasingly 
institutionalized, with the ﬁve-year plans being the most structured tool 
for setting agendas and priorities, supplemented by the medium- and 
long-term plans with varying time spans up to 15 or more years. The 
regular planning cycle provides an institutionalized channel for scientists 
to participate in China's S&T policymaking (Zhao 2014).
Similarly, consultation with experts has been increasingly used in Chi-
na's education policymaking (Han and Ye 2017) and healthcare reform 
(Thompson 2009). In the case of healthcare, China's Healthcare System 
Reform Coordinating Small Group invited six expert organizations in 
March 2007 to submit reform proposals, including Peking University, 
Fudan University, Development Research Center of the State Council, 
the World Health Organization, the World Bank and McKinsey & Com-
pany. Although none of the proposals was released publicly, 'informed 
opinions and information are widely available' and the debate among 
invited scholars 'indicates a positive trend toward inclusiveness in 
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Chinese policymaking' (Thompson 2009: 65). In the case of education 
policymaking, Han and Ye (2017: 405) note that higher education insti-
tutions and scholars have been incorporated into China's policymaking 
process as 'professional interest groups'.
Not only is expert consultation on the rise, public participation in 
policymaking has also been growing. A case study of the 'Outline of 
China's National Plan for Medium and Long-term Education Reform 
and Development (2010–2020)' suggests that this plan was the 'Party and 
central government's ﬁrst major effort to incorporate a broad spectrum 
of public opinion in China's policymaking process, especially those 
non-governmental policy actors such as civil think tanks, individual 
citizens and businessmen' and that 'the degree and scope of public 
participation in the creation of the Outline were unprecedented' (Han 
and Ye 2017: 406–407). 
Against the broad trend of institutionalization, decentralization 
and expanded participation, there are still unanswered questions 
regarding the extent and pattern of changes in China's policymaking. 
Scholars have used 'policy network' theory to describe and analyse 
China's education policymaking. Drawing on Marsh and Rhodes' 
(1992) taxonomy that classiﬁes a policy network based on stability, 
inclusiveness and power relations within it, Han and Ye (2017: 393) 
have mapped the evolution of China's education policymaking from 
a 'policy community' in the 1980s, which, as the most integrated type 
of policy network, features 'a limited number of actors and a clear 
hierarchical relationship among them', to an 'issue network' by 2010, 
which is at the opposite end of the 'policy community' and character-
ized by 'a large number of heterogeneous actors managing various 
types and amounts of resources'. However, given unequal power rela-
tions among heterogeneous policy stakeholders in the Chinese context, 
one has to cast doubt on whether China has shifted from 'hierarchical 
governance' to 'network governance'. Likewise, in pondering the po-
litical signiﬁcance of public participation observed in the making of 
China's healthcare reform, as unveiled in 2009, Kornreich et al. (2012: 
178) caution against confusing consultation as 'a means of two-way 
communication employed by decision-makers solely to obtain infor-
mation' with deliberation, which implies responsive decision-makers 
doing more than solicit input. Taken together, there still needs to be 
nuanced, in-depth analysis of speciﬁc cases to assess the extent and 
nature of changes in China's policymaking.
_________________________________________________________________________11
_____________________________________________________ China's World-Class 2.0 
The Making of the 985 Project and the Double World-
Class Project
China's World-Class 1.0 is associated with the 985 Project. On 4 May 
1998, then President Jiang Zemin declared at the centennial celebration 
of Peking University, 'To achieve modernization, China should have 
several advanced, world-class universities'. China's Ministry of Educa-
tion (MOE) acted on Jiang's speech to launch what later became known 
as the 985 Project. 
Details of the making of the 985 Project can be found in Chen (2011). 
In a nutshell, it involved collaboration between university and govern-
ment in a process that was ﬁrst 'bottom up' and then 'top down'. Peking 
University, which symbolizes China's modern institutions of higher 
learning, planned to celebrate its 100th anniversary on 4 May 1998. In 
February 1998, the MOE and the Municipal Government of Beijing jointly 
held a meeting to discuss the Peking University president's report on the 
preparatory work for the centennial celebration. The three parties agreed 
that Peking University would propose a plan to invite President Jiang 
Zemin and other leaders to attend the centennial celebration and the 
MOE and Beijing Municipal Government would jointly draft a request to 
the General Ofﬁce of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party for approval. In line with established practice, Peking University 
would prepare the speech for President Jiang Zemin. The University 
clearly stated in the draft that 'to achieve modernization, China should 
have several advanced, world-class socialist universities'. When the draft 
was sent to the Central Committee for approval, the statement was modi-
ﬁed from 'several advanced, world-class socialist universities' to 'several 
advanced, world-class universities'. Finally, the centennial celebration 
was held on 4 May 1998 at the Great Hall of the People, with all the top 
leaders in attendance and Jiang Zemin delivered the keynote speech 
prepared by Peking University. The MOE seized this opportunity to 
roll out the 'Action Plan for Revitalizing Education in the Twenty-First 
Century', which contained plans to build world-class universities.
Starting with targeted support for Peking University and Tsinghua 
University, the 985 Project passed through three stages (1999–2002, 
2004–2007 and 2009–2013), being expanded to nine universities dur-
ing Phase 1 and eventually to 39 (Zong and Zhang 2017). Without 
explicit rules and criteria governing the selection process, the 985 
Project lacked transparency (Wang 2011). Moreover, as the mem-
bership in this elite league was fixed, the 985 Project solidified 
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stratification between participating universities and those excluded 
(Zong and Zhang 2017). 
The Double World-Class Project, or China's World-Class 2.0, is as-
sociated with leadership succession from Hu Jintao to Xi Jinping. It 
ofﬁcially started in October 2015 when China's State Council released 
the 'Overall Plan on Coordinating Development of World-Class Uni-
versities and World-Class Disciplines'. The document sets out targets 
and basic principles for the project. China's MOE, Ministry of Finance 
(MOF) and National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
followed up in January 2017 with a document specifying implementa-
tion measures. 
Compared with the 985 Project, the Double World-Class Project did 
not start as a bottom-up proposal. Instead, with the succession of lead-
ership, there were growing calls for 'top-level design' to make reforms 
more coordinated, comprehensive and determined. It was widely per-
ceived that towards the end of Hu Jintao leadership, China's reform had 
become too fragmented and reached stalemate. The solution, endorsed 
by the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) in November 2013, was to comprehensively deepen 
reform by strengthening top-level design. In this context, the Double 
World-Class Project has stronger top-down features than the 985 Project. 
In terms of project initiation, China's transition from World-Class 1.0 to 
2.0 does not conform to the general pattern of shifting from top-down 
to bottom-up policymaking.
Another major change is that the selection process for participating 
universities has become more transparent and rule based. Procedurally, 
it involved four steps. Step 1 was the setting up of an expert committee 
headed by Han Qide, vice chairman of the National Committee of the 
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and president of the 
Chinese Society for Science and Technology. Members of this committee 
are from central ministries, universities, research organizations, profes-
sional associations and consulting organizations. Step 2 was the selection 
of a list of 137 universities by the expert committee based on third-party 
evaluations and consideration of various factors such as national strate-
gies, industrial needs and regional development. These universities have 
one or more disciplines that can be developed into world-class ones. 
Out of the 137 universities, the expert committee further selected 42 to 
be developed into world-class universities. Step 3 was the development 
of a work plan by universities on the proposed list. After the review by 
provincial governments or central ministries in charge of those universi-
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ties, the individual work plans were submitted to the MOE, MOF and 
NDRC. The expert committee was asked to give detailed comments on 
each plan. The MOE, MOF and NDRC then gave instructions to each 
university to revise their work plan. Step 4 represented the ﬁnalization 
of the list of 'World-Class Universities' and 'Universities with World-
Class Disciplines' by the MOE, MOF and NDRC before submission to 
the State Council for approval. After approval, the MOE, MOF and 
NDRC released the list on 20 September 2017.3 
The MOE, MOF and NDRC appointed an expert committee to oversee 
the selection process. The full list of committee members has not been 
released. Nevertheless, a published interview with the MOE, MOF 
and NDRC ofﬁcials reveals that included in the committee are ofﬁcials 
from central ministries and experts from higher education institutions, 
professional associations and consulting organizations.4 Online sources 
suggest that some of the committee members are former presidents 
of China's most renowned universities, such as Huang Daren, former 
president of Sun Ya-Sen University and Zhong Binglin, former president 
of Beijing Normal University (e.g., Huang 2017). Notably, the published 
interview with MOE, MOF and NDRC ofﬁcials highlights the presence 
of representatives from the disciplines of Marxism, Chinese traditional 
culture and political education.5  
To further rationalize the selection process, third-party evaluations 
were systematically used for the ﬁrst time to assist in decision-making. 
The MOE, MOF and NDRC did not name any speciﬁc rating agen-
cies but revealed that the expert committee consulted both domestic 
third-party evaluations and foreign-based world university rankings. 
It is likely that the best-known rankings, such as QS World University 
Rankings and Times Higher Education World University Rankings, were 
instrumental in selecting universities and disciplines for the Double 
World-Class Project.            
Analysing the Extent and Patterns of Change
This section compares China's World-Class 1.0 and World-Class 2.0 
against the three broad themes of institutionalization, decentralization 
and expanded participation. Compared with the 985 Project, there is 
clear evidence that the Double World-Class Project demonstrates greater 
institutionalization in terms of selection and project management. As 
described earlier, the 985 Project lacked clear and explicit rules in the 
selection process. Peking University and Tsinghua University were 
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the ﬁrst batch to be included in the project, followed by seven other 
universities. Together they formed Tier 1 universities, accounting for 
over 40 per cent of total funding in Phase 1 (1999–2002) and Phase 2 
(2004–2007) (Wang 2011). Including the nine Tier 1 universities, a total 
of 34 universities made the list in Phase 1; another ﬁve were added in 
Phase 2. Due to budgetary constraints at the end of Phase 2, the central 
government decided not to expand the list further (Zong and Zhang 
2017). Many universities on a par with the 30 Tier 2 universities in 
terms of performance and quality were thus excluded (Cheng 2011). 
Not surprisingly, the 985 Project has been widely criticized for the lack 
of transparent, fair and rule-based selection (Chen 2011; Cheng 2011; 
Yan 2011; Zong and Zhang 2017).
By comparison, through its top-level design, the Double World-Class 
Project set clearer rules and procedures from the very beginning. In 
particular, an expert committee was set up to oversee the nomination 
and selection of participating universities. Notably, the expert committee 
systematically used third-party evaluations to assist the decision-mak-
ing. According to the joint press release by the MOE, MOF and NDRC, 
the expert committee consulted four types of domestic third-party evalu-
ation: Type 1 focusing on the quality of undergraduate and graduate 
education; Type 2 on the academic performance of individual disciplines; 
Type 3 on the 'social contribution' of universities under consideration, 
measured by government awards; and Type 4 based on 'policy-oriented 
factors', such as the ability to serve national needs and strategic plans.6 
In addition, international third-party evaluations were also used to 
rank individual disciplines in terms of academic performance and in-
ternational recognition. According to Huang Daren (2017), a member 
of the expert committee, the Double World-Class Project allowed the 
expert committee to play a larger role in the nomination and selection 
process, which was 'strict and serious' and involved deliberation and 
registered ballots. 
Chen and Naughton (2016) view increasing institutionalization as a 
result of efforts at rationalizing policymaking by assigning tasks in the 
policy process to specialized actors and making objectives and criteria 
of policy available to serve as the basis for discussion and deliberation. 
If we follow their operational deﬁnition, there is clear evidence for the 
institutionalization thesis. Compared with the 985 Project, the Double 
World-Class Project gave the expert committee a larger role in the 
selection process and for the ﬁrst time systematically used third-party 
evaluations, which help to rationalize policymaking.  
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In contrast to the clear trend towards greater institutionalization, 
the trend towards decentralization is much more ambiguous. Decen-
tralization is a multidimensional concept encompassing ﬁnance, control 
and delivery (Cummings and Riddell 1994). It is often believed that 
decentralized ﬁnancing would lead to decentralized control. However, 
these two aspects of decentralization are conceptually and analyti-
cally different. In terms of ﬁnancial support, the central government 
co-funded the 985 Project with the provincial governments where the 
participating universities were located. The Double World-Class Project 
will also co-fund participating universities by the central and provincial 
governments. Details of the arrangement are not publicly available yet. 
Nonetheless, due to budgetary constraints, the central government 
indicates that it will not substantially increase spending on the Double 
World-Class Project from that supplied to the 985 Project. In contrast, to 
have more universities within their jurisdiction on the list of the Double 
World-Class Project, provincial governments have tried—within their 
ﬁnancial capability—to outcompete their rivals by showing their strong 
commitment and generous support for their universities (Bi 2017). Pro-
vincial governments will probably play a larger role in ﬁnancing the 
Double World-Class Project than the 985 Project. The decentralization 
thesis is therefore likely to gain support from the ﬁnancing point of 
view. Indeed, the media have lamented that this would beneﬁt richer 
provinces such as Guangdong.7
However, a careful analysis of listed universities suggests that ﬁnan-
cial decentralization does not necessarily empower provincial govern-
ments vis-à-vis the central government in terms of decision-making. 
In the case of the Double World-Class Project, within the principles, 
guidelines and procedures set by the central government, there is little 
room for provincial governments to inﬂuence the outcome of selec-
tion. The central government from the very beginning decided that the 
Double World-Class Project would build on rather than overhaul the 
985 Project and the 211 Project (State Council 2015). Structurally, the 
Double World-Class Project would have two lists, one for those to be 
developed into world-class universities and one for those having one 
or more world-class disciplines. In principle, 'World-Class Universi-
ties' would have a high overlap with 985 Project universities, while 
'Universities with World-Class Disciplines' have a high overlap with 
211 Project universities. This guideline not only restricted the inﬂuence 
of provincial governments, whether they sought to seek changes or 
maintain the status quo, but also set a limit on the expert committee in 
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the selection of universities for priority funding. It became clear to the 
expert committee that all 985 Project universities should make the list 
of 'World-Class Universities' and all 211 Project universities should be 
'Universities with World-Class Disciplines' (Huang 2017). 
In effect, out of the 42 'World-Class Universities', only three were 
non-985 Project universities. They are Xinjiang University (located in 
Xinjiang), Yunnan University (Yunnan) and Zhengzhou University 
(Henan). These three universities are from the less developed central 
and western regions. Therefore, one cannot argue that ﬁnancial decen-
tralization would empower richer provinces in the decision-making. It 
is equally notable that the selection of these universities is not entirely 
merit based. Xinjiang University is probably selected for strategic rea-
sons. In recent years, violent attacks by Uighur militants using knives, 
guns or bombs have plagued Xinjiang. In response, China's central 
government has invested heavily in stability maintenance and socio-
economic development in Xinjiang. The inclusion of Xinjiang University 
in the list of 'World-Class Universities' has to be understood in this 
larger context. By design, a 'World-Class University' should have one 
or more world-class disciplines. There were two ways to decide on the 
world-class disciplines. One was by the expert committee based on the 
ranking of third-party evaluations—this is a merit-based method. The 
other way was 'self-determined' by a number of selected universities for 
disciplines that fail to qualify as world-class disciplines in the ﬁrst way. 
World-class disciplines decided the second way are therefore considered 
sub-par against those decided in the ﬁrst way. Xinjiang University has 
three 'World-Class Disciplines': Marxism, chemistry and computer sci-
ence. The three disciplines were decided by Xinjiang University rather 
than the expert committee, implying that Xinjiang University would not 
make it onto the list of 'World-Class Universities' if academic excellence 
were the sole standard. 
Likewise, Zhengzhou University has three 'World-Class Disciplines', 
namely, clinical medicine, material science and chemistry, which were 
decided by the university instead of the expert committee. According 
to Tan Songhua, a member of State Education Advisory Council, there 
were 'special reasons' why Zhengzhou University made it onto the list of 
'World-Class Universities'. A major contributing factor is that it is a top 
university in Henan, which is China's most populous province with over 
100 million people, but which did not have a 985 Project university.8   
Different from Xinjiang University and Zhengzhou University, Yun-
nan University has two 'World-Class Disciplines' (ethnic studies and 
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ecology) that met the standards set by the expert committee. Yunnan 
University's membership in the league of 'World-Class Universities' is 
therefore more convincing. Nonetheless, one cannot rule out that the 
national strategy to strengthen higher education in the western region 
worked in favour of Yunnan University. As expounded by Liu Haifeng, 
a member of the expert committee, 'Yunnan University was a key-point 
university back in the Republic era, Zhengzhou University is from the 
most populous province with a good momentum of development and 
Xinjiang University is important due to its location in a western ethnic 
minority region'.9 In other words, in considering which non-985 Project 
universities to be included in the list of 'World-Class Universities', pri-
ority was given to universities from the central and western provinces 
for reasons unrelated to a province's economic strength.
By contrast, it is the other list—'Universities with World-Class 
Disciplines'—that shows a stronger association between a province's 
economic strength and the likelihood of having one or more non-211 
Project universities on the list. As mentioned earlier, all former 211 
Project universities were included in the list of 'Universities with World-
Class Disciplines'. In addition, 25 non-211 Project universities made it 
onto the list. Table 1 presents the distribution of these universities by 
province. Nearly a third—eight out of 25—are located in Beijing; Jiangsu 
and Shanghai combine to account for another third. The rest go to ﬁve 
other provinces. Notably, three are in Sichuan, which is in the western 
region. Tianjin and Zhejiang also gain from the expansion with two 
newly added universities. Guangdong and Henan take up the ﬁnal two, 
leaving the other 23 provinces with no increase at all. Region-wise, the 
Chinese statistical system divides China into four regions: the eastern 
region (with the highest level of economic development), the northeast-
ern region (the rust belt region with a high concentration of state-owned 
enterprises), the central region (with an intermediate level of economic 
development) and the western region (with the lowest level of economic 
development). Table 1 shows that in line with the decentralization thesis, 
the eastern region has disproportionately beneﬁted from the expansion 
of the list of 'Universities with World-Class Disciplines' (compared with 
the list of 211 Project universities), accounting for 84 per cent—21 out 
of 25—of the newly added universities. Seen in this light, regional dis-
parities have even widened during the transition from the 211 Project 
to the Double World-Class Project.  
Regarding the thesis of expanded participation, there is some sup-
porting evidence. In the case of the Double World-Class Project, the 
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role of experts in the policy process has been institutionalized and ex-
panded through the expert committee. It is also clear that the Double 
World-Class Project has responded to some of the criticisms voiced 
by experts apropos the 985 Project. Despite the many achievements of 
the 985 Project, China's education experts have highlighted a number 
of problems. For one, the selection process was not transparent and 
merit based. For another, the membership of the 985 Project was ﬁxed, 
resulting in a premature exclusion of many other aspiring universi-
ties and a lack of competition among the selected universities (Cheng 
2011; Wang 2011; Zong and Zhang 2017). Echoing such criticisms, the 
ﬁrst document on the Double World-Class Project, issued by the State 
Council (2015), explicitly acknowledged the problems of 'ﬁxed mem-
bership, lacking competition and overlapping' (State Council 2015). 
In response, the second document, jointly issued by the MOE, MOF 
and NDRC (2017), decided to set up the expert committee to advise on 
how to build 'World-Class Universities' and 'World-Class Disciplines' 
and produce a list of universities to be funded by the project. It also 
decided to establish a 'dynamic adjustment' mechanism to encourage 
inter-university competition. At least three competition-enhancing 
measures have been introduced. One is the further split of 'World-Class 
Universities' into category A and category B. Category A universities 
are considered better and more competitive. The purpose is to create a 
sense of crisis for category B universities and urge them to catch up. Six 
out of 42 'World-Class Universities' fall into category B, including three 
985 Project universities and three newly promoted universities (Xinjiang 
University, Yunnan University and Zhengzhou University). A second 
measure is the end of permanent membership. The list of 'World-Class 
Universities' or 'Universities with World-Class Disciplines' is subject 
to change. A dynamic adjustment mechanism has been introduced to 
reshufﬂe the lists based on regular performance evaluations. A third 
measure is the link between government funding and university per-
formance. Underperforming universities will see their funding cut. If 
no improvement is made, their membership of the elite league will be in 
jeopardy (MOE et al. 2017). Ofﬁcials in charge of the Double World-Class 
Project see these competition-enhancing measures as a major innovation 
that sufﬁciently sets it apart from the 985 Project and the 211 Project.10 
It is clear that the Double World-Class Project has been responsive to 
the concerns and suggestions made by education experts.
However, there is also clear evidence of the limits of participation in 
the case of the Double World-Class Project. The types of policy stake-
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holders are much less heterogeneous than what the 'issue network' 
approach implies. Within the government hierarchy, provincial govern-
ments had little impact on the selection of participating universities, due 
in large part to the principles and rules set by the central government. 
As described earlier, the overwhelming majority of seats—39 out of 
42—in the league of 'World-Class Universities' were reserved for the 
985 Project universities, leaving only three open to competition and lob-
bying. In the case of 'Universities with World-Class Disciplines', while 
more seats—25 out of 95—were available for competition and lobbying, 
the inﬂuence of provincial governments was seriously restricted by the 
rule that the majority of 'World-Class Disciplines' were to be determined 
by the expert committee based on third-party evaluations. Outside the 
government hierarchy, education experts were the main stakeholders in 
the making of the Double World-Class Project. Beyond this professional 
group, there were few non-governmental actors who had visible inﬂu-
ence on the project. The high standards of 'World-Class Universities' or 
'World-Class Disciplines' set up insurmountable barriers to participation 
by private universities as well as the majority of public universities. 
Even for education experts, there are limits for their participation. 
While members of the expert committee had access to the policy process 
within the principles and rules set by the central government, one may 
argue that many education experts in this committee represented the 
interest of elite universities rather than the broader higher education 
sector, as evidenced in the overrepresentation of (former) university 
presidents on the committee. One can also argue that the way the expert 
committee was formed favoured certain disciplines. Not surprisingly, 
natural sciences have been favoured over social sciences. Moreover, 
while the quest for world-class status is the primary goal for natural 
sciences, the emphasis for philosophy and social sciences, as clearly 
stated in the second document on the Double World-Class Project (MOE 
et al. 2017), is on 'Chinese characteristics' (zhongguo tese), 'Chinese style' 
(zhongguo fengge) and 'Chinese appeal' (zhongguo qipai). In the joint press 
release by China's MOE, MOF and NDRC, ofﬁcials in charge of the 
Double World-Class Project emphasized that when forming the expert 
committee, special consideration was given to representatives for 'Marx-
ism, traditional Chinese culture and political education'.11 It is illustrative 
to compare the presence of sociology or political science with Marxism 
on the list of 'Universities with World-Class Disciplines'. For sociology 
or political science, only two top universities were selected, compared 
with six universities for the discipline of Marxism. 
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To a great extent, the bifurcated attitudes towards natural sciences and 
social sciences mirror Xi Jinping's own views (Zhao 2016). Xi sees science 
and technology as the foundations of national strength and prosperity. 
He has promised to respect the creativity of scientists and support free 
and bold scientiﬁc exploration. He said at the 2016 National Conference 
on Science and Technology that 'scientists should be allowed to freely 
explore and test the bold hypotheses they put forward'.12 In contrast, 
nearly two weeks before he addressed this Conference, Xi attended a 
symposium to discuss philosophy and social sciences in China. Instead 
of encouraging free, bold exploration, Xi called for developing a system 
of philosophy and social sciences with Chinese characteristics that in-
corporates the country's socialist practices. He urged efforts to 'care for, 
foster and make full use of' scholars in philosophy and social science 
ﬁelds and make them 'advocates of advanced thinking, trailblazers of 
academic research, guides of social ethos and staunch supporters of 
Party governance'. In particular, he called on party ofﬁcials to 'spot, 
foster and assemble' a group of theoreticians well versed in Marxist 
theories and Chinese and Western cultures and to take initiatives to 
befriend scholars in the social science ﬁelds.13
While the Double World-Class Project has addressed some of the 
major concerns voiced by education experts, such as ﬁxed membership, 
lack of transparent and merit-based selection and lack of competition 
among participating universities, it has largely ignored some other major 
concerns. Many education experts have stressed university autonomy 
as essential for building world-class universities. They criticize the 985 
Project for having been weak in this regard. Cheng (2011: 28) pointed 
out that the 'direct result of this government-led approach' is that 'the 
MOE's power and control over institutions of higher education has ac-
tually increased, which is not conducive to the universities' autonomy 
over their own management and development'. Noting that 'due to the 
current increase in government-driven, top-down ''projects'', universi-
ties must cater to the will of the government to obtain resources', Yan 
(2011: 65) proposed that, 'to ensure the relative autonomy of universities 
and free inquiry for scholars, it is necessary to allocate public resources 
at the legislative level, legalize and standardize the exercise of power 
and behavior of the administrative authorities and clarify, as much as 
possible, the relationship and boundaries between universities and the 
government'. Not surprisingly, the Double World-Class Project is not 
keen to entertain ideas along these lines. In fact, the problem of micro-
management seems to have become even more cumbersome. Gong Ke, 
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President of Nankai University from 2011 to January 2018, complained 
in a published interview that 'the government may have decentralized 
some power, but we did not feel it […] Instead, government documents, 
meetings and inspections have increased in recent years, for instance, 
50% more government documents (issued to us) in the ﬁrst ten months 
of 2016 than in the whole year of 2015 and 40% more in 2015 than in 
2014.'14 Overall, the participation of education experts in the making of 
the project was limited and their impacts were contingent on the CCP's 
agenda and ideological preferences.  
Discussion and Conclusion
China's quest to have world-class universities started in the late 1990s 
with the 985 Project. To a lesser extent, the 211 Project launched in the 
mid-1990s was also part of this effort. After nearly two decades, China 
rolled out a new programme known as the Double World-Class Project 
to replace the 985 Project and the 211 Project. The making of the Double 
World-Class Project lasted from 2015 to 2017. After the announcement 
of the list of 42 'World-Class Universities' and another 95 'Universities 
with World-Class Disciplines' in September 2017, the new project entered 
the implementation stage. 
This paper compares the making of the Double World-Class Project 
with that of the 985 Project to shed light on the extent and pattern of 
changes in China's policymaking. The 985 Project emerged out of uni-
versity–government collaboration in a process that was ﬁrst bottom up 
and then top down. The selection of universities underwent different 
phases without clearly preset standards and procedures. The expansion 
of the list of participating universities came to a halt by the end of the 
second phase (2004–2007) due to central government budgetary con-
straints. By comparison, the making of the Double World-Class Project 
is best described as a top-down process and a product of 'top-level 
design'. The State Council from the very beginning set the principles, 
rules and procedures to steer the making process. In response to some 
of the criticisms against the 985 Project, the State Council decided to set 
up an expert committee to oversee the selection process and introduce 
measures to enhance competition among participating universities. 
What does this case study reveal about the evolution of policymaking 
in China? The prevailing literature has identiﬁed broad trends towards 
institutionalization, decentralization and expanded participation in 
the Chinese context. If our primary purpose is to look for evidence in 
support of the prevailing literature, we can ﬁnd ample material in this 
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study. Compared with the 985 Project, the Double World-Class Project 
is much more institutionalized, as evidenced in the preset guidelines, 
rules and procedures and the use of expert committee and third-party 
evaluations to rationalize the selection process. There is also evidence 
for the decentralization thesis. Provincial governments have taken ini-
tiatives to support universities within their jurisdiction. They will likely 
play an increasingly large role in co-funding the Double World-Class 
Project. The impact of provincial governments will become stronger at 
the implementation stage. Reportedly, Guangdong province has pledged 
over 10 billion yuan (US$ 1.6 billion) to support its universities during 
the 13th Five-Year Period (2016–2020), while some provinces in western 
China can only commit 200 million yuan.15 With insufﬁcient help from 
the central government, some top universities in the western region will 
have great difﬁculty keeping their highly sought-after professors, which 
in turn can negatively affect their standing in third-party evaluations. 
Finally, the Double World-Class Project also demonstrates evidence 
for the thesis of expanded participation. The role of education experts 
is much more visible and institutionalized in the Double World-Class 
Project than in the 985 Project.        
Equally important, this case study shows the need to look beyond the 
thesis of institutionalization, decentralization and expanded participa-
tion. In fact, some changes can be interpreted as counter-evidence. While 
the emphasis on 'top-level design' is in line with the institutionalization 
thesis, it runs counter to the decentralization thesis. Despite the trend of 
growing ﬁnancial decentralization, provincial governments have limited 
inﬂuence on the making of the Double World-Class Project. The deci-
sion to select Xinjiang University, Yunnan University and Zhengzhou 
University for the list of 'World-Class Universities' is not a result of inter-
provincial competition but propelled by the national needs for security 
and stability in its border province (in the case of Xinjiang University) 
and equitable development in the less developed central and western 
regions. The growing ﬁnancial responsibility of provincial governments 
does not increase their power vis-à-vis the central government in the 
making of the Double World-Class Project. There are large gaps between 
ﬁscal decentralization and the decentralization of policymaking. The 
thesis of expanded participation is also insufﬁcient or even mislead-
ing, given the lack of participation by non-governmental actors except 
invited educational experts. 
The seemingly contradictory ﬁndings suggest that institutionaliza-
tion, decentralization and participation are multifaceted concepts. 
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For each concept, different components or dimensions can change at 
varying paces. In a complex policymaking process, institutionalization, 
de-institutionalization and institutional innovation can co-exist. In the 
case of the Double World-Class Project, the ﬁrst-time use of third-party 
evaluations to select universities is best viewed as an institutional in-
novation rather than institutionalization. This case study also suggests 
that institutionalization, decentralization and expanded participation 
do not necessarily move in tandem, reinforcing each other. As discussed 
earlier, the 'top-level design' leads to greater institutionalization in the 
Double World-Class Project. However, the preset principles and rules 
limit the participation of provincial governments and non-governmental 
actors in the decision-making process. 
More importantly, this case study shows that in the Chinese context 
there are limits to the highly celebrated institutionalization, decentrali-
zation and expanded participation. While normatively desirable, the 
characterization of China's policymaking as an evolution from 'hier-
archical governance' to 'network governance', or from 'consultation' to 
'deliberation', is a premature one, especially for multibillion, high-stakes 
policy initiatives such as the Double World-Class Project.          
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 NOTES
1  The 211 Project was launched in 1995 to uplift teaching, research and administration 
standards in about 100 higher education institutions and in certain key disciplines 
in the twenty-ﬁrst century. The 985 Project, initiated in 1998, was more selective and 
also more generous in funding than the 211 Project.
2  The other three strategies are 'restructuring', 'merger' and 'cooperation'.
3  http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/s271/201709/t20170921_314928.html (accessed 
25 September 2017).
4  Ibid.
5  Ibid.
6  http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/s271/201709/t20170921_314928.html (accessed 
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25 September 2017).
7  http://edu.people.com.cn/GB/1055/3224824.html (accessed 3 October 2017).
8  http://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1801624 (accessed 21 February 
2018).
9  Ibid.
10  http://edu.people.com.cn/GB/1055/3224824.html (accessed 3 October 2017).
11  http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/s271/201709/t20170921_314928.html (accessed 
25 September 2017).
12  http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-05/31/content_25542620.htm (accessed 
31 May 2016).
13 http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-05/17/c_1118882832.htm (accessed 31 
May 2016).
14  http://www.lwinst.com/cjgjzk201713/4622.htm (accessed 3 October 2017).
15  http://www.infzm.com/content/129344 (accessed 29 September 2017).
REFERENCES
Altbach, Philip G. 2013. 'Advancing the National and Global Knowledge Economy: The 
Role of Research Universities in Developing Countries'. Studies in Higher Education 
38 (3): 316–330. https://doi.org/10.1080/03075079.2013.773222.
Benner, Mats, Li Liu and Sylvia Schwaag Serger 2012. 'Head in the Clouds and Feet 
on the Ground: Research Priority Setting in China'. Science and Public Policy 39 (2): 
258–270. https://doi.org/10.1093/scipol/scs006.
Bi, Jianhong 2017. 'Gedi shuang yiliu jianshe fang'an zongshu' (An Overview of Local 
Plans to Build World-Class Universities and Universities with World-Class Dis-
ciplines). Zhongguo jiaoyu caizheng (Educational Finance in China) No. 136, China 
Institute for Educational Financial Research, Peking University.
Chen, Ling and Barry Naughton 2016. 'An Institutionalized Policy-making Mechanism: 
China's Return to Techno-Industrial Policy'. Research Policy 45: 2,138–2,152. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2016.09.014.
Chen, Xuefei 2011. 'Ideal-Oriented Policymaking: An Analysis of the 985 Project 
Policy Process'. Chinese Education and Society 44 (5): 8–18. https://doi.org/10.2753/
CED1061-1932440501.
Cheng, Ying 2011. 'A Reﬂection on the Effects of the 985 Project'. Chinese Education and 
Society 44 (5): 19–30. https://doi.org/10.2753/CED1061-1932440502.
Cummings, William K. and Abby Riddell 1994. 'Alternative Policies for the Finance, 
Control, and Delivery of Basic Education'. International Journal of Educational Research 
21: 751–828. https://doi.org/10.1016/0883-0355(94)90002-7.
Gao, Charlotte 2017. 'A Closer Look at China's World-Class Universities Project'. The 
Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/a-closer-look-at-chinas-world-class-
universities-project/. 
Grove, Jack 2017. 'China Targets ''World-Class'' Status for 42 Universities'. Times Higher 
Education. https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/china-targets-world-
class-status-42-universities. 
Han, Shuangmiao and Fugui Ye 2017. 'China's Education Policy-making: A Policy 
Network Perspective'. Journal of Education Policy 32: 389–413. https://doi.org/10.1
080/02680939.2017.1291998.
Hannum, Emily 2003. 'Poverty and Basic Education in Rural China: Villages, House-
holds, and Girls' and Boys' Enrollment'. Comparative Education Review 47: 141–159. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/376542.
_________________________________________________________________________25
_____________________________________________________ China's World-Class 2.0 
Huang, Daren 2017, 'Wo suo liaojie de ''shuang yiliu'' jianshe' (What I Know about the 
''Double World-Class Project''). http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/moe_2082/
zl_2017n/2017_zl46/201709/t20170921_314930.html. 
Huang, Futao 2017. 'Double World-Class Project Has More Ambitious Aims'. University 
World News. http://www.universityworldnews.com/article.php?story=20170929
13334471.
Kornreich, Yoel, Ilan Vertinsky and Pitman B. Potter 2012. 'Consultation and Delibera-
tion in China: The Making of China's Health-Care Reform'. The China Journal 68: 
176–203. https://doi.org/10.1086/666583.
Lieberthal, Kenneth and Michel Oksenberg 1988. Policy Making in China: Leaders, Struc-
tures, and Processes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Liu, Feng Chao, Denis Fred Simon, Yu Tao Sun and Cong Cao 2011. 'China's Innova-
tion Policies: Evolution, Institutional Structure, and Trajectory'. Research Policy 40: 
917–931. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2011.05.005.
Ma, Jun and Muhua Lin 2012. 'Policymaking in China: A Review of Chinese Scholar-
ship'. China Review 12: 95–122.
Marsh, David and R. A. W. Rhodes 1992. Policy Networks in British Government. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198278528.001.0001.
Mertha, Andrew 2009. '''Fragmented Authoritarianism 2.0'': Political Pluralization 
in the Chinese Policy Process'. The China Quarterly 200: 995–1012. https://doi.
org/10.1017/S0305741009990592.
Ministry of Education, Ministry of Finance and National Development and Reform 
Commission, People's Republic of China 2017. 'Tongchou tuijin shijie yiliu daxue 
he yiliu xueke jianshe shishi banfa (zanxing)' (Tentative Methods for Coordinating 
Development of World-Class Universities and World-Class Disciplines). http://
www.moe.gov.cn/srcsite/A22/moe_843/201701/t20170125_295701.html. 
Mok, Ka Ho 2002. 'Policy of Decentralization and Changing Governance of Higher 
Education in Post-Mao China'. Public Administration and Development 22: 261–273 
https://doi.org/10.1002/pad.222.
Mok, Ka Ho 2005. 'Globalization and Educational Restructuring: University Merg-
ing and Changing Governance in China'. Higher Education 50: 57–88. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s10734-004-6347-z.
Montinola, Gabriella, Yingyi Qian and Barry R. Weingast 1995. 'Federalism, Chinese 
Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China'. World Politics 48: 50–81. 
https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.1995.0003.
Ngok, Kinglun 2007. 'Chinese Education Policy in the Context of Decentralization and 
Marketization: Evolution and Implications.' Asia Paciﬁc Education Review 8: 142–157. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03025840.
Ngok, Kinglun and Weiqing Guo 2008. 'The Quest for World Class Universities in 
China: Critical Reﬂections'. Policy Futures in Education 6: 545–557. https://doi.
org/10.2304/pﬁe.2008.6.5.545.
Newton-Tanzer, Gavin 2017. 'How Will China's ''Double First Class'' Project Change 
Higher Education in China?' https://www.hufﬁngtonpost.com/entry/how-will-
chinas-double-ﬁrst-class-project-change_us_5a20200fe4b02edd56c6d748. 
Peters, Michael A. and Tina Nesley 2018. 'China's Double First-Class University Strat-
egy'. Educational Philosophy and Theory, DOI: 10.1080/00131857.2018.1438822. 
Phillips, Nicky 2017. 'Striving for a Research Renaissance'. Nature 543. http://www.
nature.com/nature/journal/v543/n7646_supp/full/543S7a.html?WT.feed_
name=subjects_biological-sciences. https://doi.org/10.1038/543S7a.
Qian, Yingyi and Barry R. Weingast 1997. 'Federalism as a Commitment to Reser-
ving Market Incentives'. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11: 83–92. https://doi.
26 ____________________ The Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 36(1)•2018
Litao Zhao _________________________________________________________________
org/10.1257/jep.11.4.83.
State Council, People's Republic of China 2015. 'Tongchou tuijin shijie yiliu daxue he 
yiliu xueke jianshe zongti fang'an' ('Overall Plan on Coordinating Development 
of World-Class Universities and World-Class Disciplines'). http://www.gov.cn/
zhengce/content/2015-11/05/content_10269.htm. 
Tan, Chang, Keshu Zheng and Weiwei Xiao 2017. 'Shuang yiliu kaiju' (The kickoff of 
the 'Double World-Class Project'). http://www.infzm.com/content/129344. 
Thompson, Drew 2009. 'China's Health Care Reform Redux', pp. 59–80 in Charles 
W. Freeman and Xiaoqing Lu (eds.), China's Capacity to Manage Infectious Diseases. 
Washington: Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
Tian, Mei and Genshu Lu 2017. 'What Price the Building of World-Class Universities? 
Academic Pressure Faced by Young Lecturers at a Research-centered University in 
China'. Teaching in Higher Education 22 (8): 957–974. https://doi.org/10.1080/1356
2517.2017.1319814.
Wang, Qi 2011. 'A Discussion on the 985 Project from a Comparative Perspective'. 
Chinese Education and Society 44 (5): 41–56. https://doi.org/10.2753/CED1061-
1932440504.
Wang, Qi, Ying Cheng and Nian Cai Liu (eds.) 2013. Building World-Class Universities: 
Different Approaches to a Shared Goal. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-94-6209-034-7.
Yan, Guangcai 2011. 'Thoughts on the Role of Government in the Development of 
World-Class Universities in China'. Chinese Education and Society 44 (5): 57–66. 
https://doi.org/10.2753/CED1061-1932440505.
Zhang, Han, Donald Patton and Martin Kenney 2013. 'Building World-Class Uni-
versities: Assessing the Impact of the 985 Project'. Research Policy 42 (3): 765–775. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.10.003.
Zhang, Xiaobo and Ravi Kanbur 2005. 'Spatial Inequality in Education and Health 
Care in China'. China Economic Review 16: 189–204. https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.chieco.2005.02.002.
Zhao, Litao 2009. 'Between Local Community and Central State: Financing Basic Educa-
tion in China'. International Journal of Educational Development 29: 366–73. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.ijedudev.2008.10.005.
Zhao, Litao 2014. 'China's Science and Technology System: Governance, Fund-
ing and Performance'. East Asian Policy 6 (3): 53–66. https://doi.org/10.1142/
S1793930514000269.
Zhao, Litao 2016. 'China's Innovation-Driven Development under Xi Jinping'. East Asian 
Policy 8 (4): 55–68. https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793930516000404.
Zhao, Litao, Ling Li and Chen Huang 2018. 'Mobilizing Resources for Education: The 
2012 ''Great Leap'' in a Province in Western China'. Journal of Contemporary China 
27: 440–456. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2018.1410980.
Zheng, Haitao, Martin de Jong and Joop Koppenjan 2010. 'Applying Policy Network 
Theory to Policy-making in China: The Case of Urban Insurance Reform'. Public 
Administration 88: 398–417. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.2010.01822.x.
Zong, Xiaohua and Wei Zhang 2017. 'Establishing World-Class Universities in China: 
Deploying a Quasi-Experimental Design to Evaluate the Net Effects of Project 985'. 
Studies in Higher Education, DOI: 10.1080/03075079.2017.1368475.
_________________________________________________________________________27
_____________________________________________________ China's World-Class 2.0 
TABLE 1. Number of Non-211 Project Universities on the list of 
'Universities with World-Class Disciplines' by Province
Province Region
Number of non-211 Project 
Universities on the list of 
'Universities with World-
Class Disciplines'
Beijing eastern 8
Jiangsu eastern 4
Shanghai eastern 4
Sichuan western 3
Tianjin eastern 2
Zhejiang eastern 2
Guangdong eastern 1
Henan central 1
Heilongjiang north-eastern 0
Liaoning north-eastern 0
Jilin north-eastern 0
Shandong eastern 0
Fujian eastern 0
Hainan eastern 0
Anhui central 0
Hebei central 0
Hubei central 0
Hunan central 0
Jiangxi central 0
Chongqing western 0
Gansu western 0
Guangxi western 0
Guizhou western 0
Inner Mongolia western 0
Ningxia western 0
Qinghai western 0
Shanxi central 0
Tibet western 0
Yunnan western 0
Xinjiang western 0
Total ---- 25
Source: Author's compilation
